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ARE BONDHOLDERS OWED A FIDUCIARY DUTY?
GEORGE S. COREY,* M. WAYNE MARR, JR.,**
AND MICHAEL F. SPIVEY***
N the last few years, a previously unheard of doctrine has taken
hold in the corporate world-corporate directors owe a duty to a
host of constituencies beyond shareholders. This doctrine is in sharp
contrast to the traditional model of corporate governance, wherein the
directors of a publicly held corporation owe a duty to only one con-
stituency, their shareholders. In this Article, the focus will be on one
other constituency, the bondholder.
Bondholders are only one class of parties interested in a corpora-
tion, the most significant other such class being shareholders. Con-
flicts of interests between these classes arise because actions by
management on behalf of shareholders may come at the bondholders'
expense. Since no fiduciary duty is presently owed to bondholders,
bondholders protect their interests with bond indentures. But the
bond indenture has over time become simplified, affording bondhold-
ers fewer protections. Therefore, arguments have emerged that the
same fiduciary duty owed to shareholders should be extended to
bondholders.'
Through a discussion of bondholder-shareholder conflicts, this Ar-
ticle will explore potential reasons why a fiduciary duty should be
owed to bondholders. The Article will also discuss alternative sources
of bondholder protection, such as bond indenture covenants, market
forces, bondholder voting rights, and bond insurance.
Thereafter, three different views, each promoting changes in the
current system, are contrasted: (1) debtholders should be extended the
same fiduciary duties as stockholders; (2) the indenture trustee should
be given power to oversee indenture negotiations and managerial dis-
cretion; and (3) corporate directors should pursue a "global" wealth
maximization strategy, in which directors attempt to maximize total
*Attorney, Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C.
* First Union Professor of Banking, Department of Finance, Clemson University; Chief
Economist, Institutional Shareholder Services Washington, D.C..
*** Associate Professor, Department of Finance, Clemson University.
1. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRp. LAW 205 (1988); McDaniel,
Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413 (1986) [hereinafter McDaniel, Cor-
porate Governance]. But see Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds,
1984 Wis. L. REv. 667.
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corporate value rather than attempting to maximize shareholder value
even where that does not yield maximum total value. Pertinent court
decisions are then presented as evidence that the courts have con-
cluded that bonds are contracts and that the holders of such bonds are
not owed any fiduciary duties by corporate directors.
I. BONDHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICTS
The market value of a firm's debt is the present value of the prom-
ised payments discounted to reflect the risk that those payments will
not be made. That risk is a function of the extent to which the value
of the firm's assets exceeds the amount of its liabilities, which amount
represents shareholder equity: debtholders are protected against de-
clines in the value of the corporation's assets to the extent of this
"pad" of shareholder equity. 2 Thus, wealth can be transferred from
debtholders to shareholders by increasing debt or by distributing as-
sets to shareholders-in other words, by increasing the firm's debt-to-
equity ratio.' For example, if new debt is issued with an equal claim
on the firm's assets and the proceeds are used to retire outstanding
equity, then current bondholders experience a loss of wealth. These
bondholders are left with only a partial claim to the firm's assets,
whereas before the new debt was issued, they had a complete claim on
the assets. In this case, total assets remain the same, but the debt to
equity ratio and therefore the firm's financial risk have increased.
Thus, the current bondholders experience a decline in the value of the
debt they hold, even though the firm's market value remains un-
changed. Shareholders profit to the extent their equity, which is con-
tingent on payment of the firm's debts, is converted to non-contingent
cash payments.4
2. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 418 (a firm's market value equals
the market value of its debt plus the market value of its stock).
3. See Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J. FIN.
EcoN. 53 (1976) (citing R. BLEAI.E & S. MYERs, PRnCItP.ES op CoRpoRATE FINANCE 294 (2d ed.
1984)).
4. T.E. CoPEL"D & J.F. WrsTON in FINANCiAL THEoRY AND CoRpoRATE PoLicy 508 (3d
ed. 1988). Corporate law does place some limitation on the shareholders' ability to do this,
essentially at the point that equity hits zero, although this characterization is an oversimplifica-
tion. REv. MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT § 6.40 (1984). This treatment roughly tracks the law's
treatment of any other type of unsecured creditor: fraudulent transfer law and bankruptcy pref-
erence law usually do not come into play until a debtor is insolvent. See, e.g., UNEF. FnAuDu-
LENT CONVEYANCES ACT (1918); 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) (1988) (enforcement of state fraudulent
transfer law by bankruptcy trustee); id. § 548 (bankruptcy fraudulent transfer law); id. § 547
(bankruptcy preference law). Unsecured creditors encounter many of the same problems as those
discussed in this Article and thus charge a higher rate of return than secured creditors. In this
Article, the terms "bondholders" and "debtholders" mean holders of unsecured corporate debt
unless otherwise specified. Both the availability of secured corporate debt and the desirability of
consistency between the law of corporate finance and general creditor law strengthen the argu-
ments in this Article against extending corporate fiduciary duties to bondholders.
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Potential conflicts then exist because bondholders have prior but
fixed claims on a firm's assets, while shareholders have limited liabil-
ity for the firm's debt and unlimited claims on a firm's assets.' As the
corporation's debt to equity ratio increases, the probability and mag-
nitude of these conflicts increase.6 The three major sources of conflict
between bondholders and shareholders are: (1) dividend payments; (2)
claim dilution; and (3) asset substitution.7
Dividend payments to shareholders reduce the value of a corpora-
tion's bonds. When a corporation issues bonds and the bonds are
priced on the assumption that the firm's dividend policy will remain
unchanged, the value of the bonds is reduced when the dividend rate
is increased so that the pad of shareholder equity is reduced.8 In fact,
in many cases, any distribution of assets to stockholders, either in
cash or otherwise, will result in a loss to bondholders because the debt
to equity ratio increases and fewer total assets remain to satisfy bond-
holder claims. 9
Shareholders can achieve the functional equivalent of a distribution
with a voluntary spin-off, where a corporation moves part of its assets
to a newly-created separate entity.'0 In a spin-off, a parent company
distributes its subsidiary's shares pro rata only to its shareholders. The
spin-off creates abnormal gains for the shareholders since they have
appropriated part of the equity pad which previously afforded protec-
tion to bondholders." The parent company's bondholders lose in a
spin-off because they no longer have a claim on the assets spun-off to
the shareholders of the new firm. 2
5. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 418.
6. Id.
7. Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117, 118 (1979).
8. Id.
9. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 419.
10. Galai & Masulis, supra note 3, at 69.
11. Id.
12. Id. However, the effects of a spin-off can be difficult to identify, because even where
the loss to debtholders is negligible, shareholders may still experience a gain. In Hite & Owers,
Security Price Reactions Around Corporate Spin-off Announcements, 12 J. FN. ECON. 409
(1983), the authors examine the security price reaction around the announcement of 123 volun-
tary spin-offs by 116 firms between 1963 and 1981 involving a pro-rata distribution of the parent
firm. The median spin-off in the sample is 6.6% of the original equity value and is associated
with an abnormal return of 7.000 for common stockholders from 50 days prior to the announce-
ment through completion of the spin-off. No evidence is found to indicate the gains to stock-
holders represent wealth transfers from senior security holders. In a related paper, Schipper &
Smith, Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Voluntary Spin-Offs, 12 J.
FIN. EcoN. 437 (1983), investigate the effect of voluntary corporate spin-off announcements on
shareholder wealth. Professors Schipper and Smith find a significant positive share price reac-
tion for 93 voluntary spin-off announcements between 1963 and 1981. The gains do not appear
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The same reduction in the value of bonds occurs with claim dilu-
tion. When a corporation sells bonds and the bonds are priced on the
assumption that no additional debt will be issued, the existing bond-
holders will incur a loss if additional debt of equal or higher priority is
issued. 3 Even though the borrowing increases the firm's assets, the
debt to equity ratio likewise increases, and the old bondholders must
share the equity with the new bondholders. Because the old bonds are
riskier, their price declines. 14 If the additional debt is incurred to fi-
nance an extraordinary distribution, as in the case of a cash self-
tender, the debt to equity ratio increases even more. i" In either case,
bond value will decline, causing a loss to the bondholders.
Furthermore, when the company markets its bonds with the stated
use to be in low-risk (low-variance) investments and the bonds are
priced accordingly, the value of the firm's stock will increase, while
the value of the bonds will decrease if the company switches from
low- to high-risk investments. 16 The corporation's shareholders have
an incentive for asset substitution, since by increasing the firm's risk,
the value of their position increases. 7
Hence, conflicts between bondholders and shareholders arise when
management acts to maximize shareholder wealth by maximizing the
firm's value and by making dividend, financing, and investment deci-
sions that lead to an expropriation of wealth from bondholders.' 8 Like
ordinary unsecured creditors, bondholders have no inherent guarantee
to come at the expense of bondholders; they suggest that the gains to shareholders may arise
from tax and regulatory advantages and/or improved managerial efficiency resulting from the
spin-off.
13. Smith & Warner, supra note 7, at 118.
14. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 419.
15. Id.
16. Smith & Warner, supra note 7, at 118.
17. Green & Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10 J.
BANK. & FIN. 391, 391 (1986); see also Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fn'. EcoN. 305 (1976).
18. See Smith & Warner, supra note 7, at 118. For one of the best explanations of the
bondholder wealth expropriation hypothesis, see COPELAND & WEsTON, supra note 4. But see
Marais, Schipper & Smith, Wealth Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIRN.
ECON. 155 (1989). Marais, Schipper, and Smith suggest that increasing leverage does not harm
existing bondholders. The authors investigated the effects of going-private buyout proposals
made from 1974 to 1985 on the value and default risk of convertible and non-convertible debt
and preferred securities. Positive average price reactions are documented for public convertible
securities and non-convertible preferred stock. Most non-convertible debt securities remain out-
standing without re-negotiation after buyouts, and minimal average price reactions are docu-
mented for public non-convertible debt. See generally Masulis, The Effect of Capital Structure
Change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers, 8 J. FIN. EcON. 139, 169-171 (1980)
(analysis on the effects of leverage changes using exchange offer (where debt is swapped for
equity)). Masulis found that 49 non-convertible bonds suffered losses of 0.3% when leverage was
increased, and the loss increased to 0.8% for 18 bonds not protected by covenants.
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that their debtors will not consume the assets on which the creditors
rely for protection, at least not until the debtor becomes insolvent.
Like ordinary creditors, if bondholders choose to remain unsecured,
they must look for some means of restricting asset appropriation by
shareholders.
II. SOURCES OF BONDHOLDER PROTECTION
Because management is bound to a fiduciary duty of care to share-
holders alone, 9 bondholders must rely on other protective mechan-
isms to safeguard their interests. Bondholders can strengthen their
position with the use of bond indenture covenants, voting rights, and
bond insurance. Market forces can also serve to protect bondholders
against adverse managerial behavior. However, even with these pro-
tective measures, bondholders may still find themselves in need of
more protection.
A. Bond Indenture Covenants
The indenture contract largely determines a debtholder's rights. The
contract governs the rights and obligations of the debt securities and
attempts to anticipate all possible contingencies that might call into
question the operation of those rights and obligations. 20 By the inclu-
sion of various covenants in the indenture contract, bondholders can
limit managerial behavior that results in the reduction of bond value.2'
Bond covenants are generally categorized into four major areas: 1)
covenants restricting new debt issues, 2) covenants restricting mergers,
3) covenants restricting dispositions of the corporation's assets, and 4)
covenants restricting the payment of dividends. 22 These covenants are
designed to reduce some of the costs associated with bondholder-
shareholder conflicts.?
19. Rnv. MODEL Burss CoRp. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
20. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 642 F.2d 929 (5th
Cir. Apr. 1981), cart. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
21. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17, at 337-38.
22. See Smith & Warner, supra note 7 (discussion of bond covenants commonly imposed on
debt issuers); see also Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J.
FRN. EcoN. 211 (1982) (examining a large randomly chosen sample of bond indentures focusing
on the constraints they set on dividend payments, which have the potential to transfer wealth
from bondholders). Kalay rmds that the nature of these restrictions supports the hypothesis that
bond covenants are structured to control the conflict of interest between stockholders and bond-
holders. He further finds that the empirical evidence suggests that these constraints are non-
binding, that is, stockholders do not pay themselves as much in dividends as they could.
23. Smith & Warner, supra note 7, at 152.
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Debt covenants have evolved into "undoubtedly the most involved
financial document that has been devised." While the bond contract
once carried numerous restrictive covenants and was once seen as un-
wieldy, a "Frankenstein monster,' '25 this is no longer true. A study
conducted over the years 1974 and 1975 found that over ninety per-
cent of a sample of public debt contained new debt issuance provi-
sions, over forty percent restricted merger activity, over thirty-five
percent restricted the disposition of the company's assets, and twenty-
three percent restricted the payment of dividends. 26
However, a more recent study by Fortune2? magazine of the 100
largest industrial companies during 1984 reports that virtually all of
the companies with senior issues had restrictions on secured debt and
sale-leaseback transactions, but fewer than twenty percent of the new
issues had any other restrictions. This study suggests that the current
trend is away from including too many restrictions in bonds. The ex-
ception to this trend is the "negative pledge clause," which prevents
companies from incurring debt with a higher priority than that al-
ready in place.n
The retreat from bond covenants can be attributed to the life of the
issue, often twenty or more years, and the near impossibility of
amending a covenant. Usually indentures are either too lenient or too
strict. When too lenient, wealth transfers may occur from bondhold-
ers to stockholders (although existing empirical evidence from the fi-
nancial economics literature indicates that this does not happen).
When too strict, indentures impose high opportunity costs on the
firm's earning capacity, which could cause an alteration of risk. Both
bondholders and shareholders have incentives to prepare indentures
with few covenants.
B. Voting Rights and Insurance
Although bondholders do have an incentive to seek representation
on the firm's board of directors, voting bonds are rarely used. A
board of directors' main concern is to protect those constituencies
who face significant risks of expropriation because their investment is
not linked to specific assets and cannot be protected in a specific way
24. Id. at 122 (citing J. KENNEDY, CoRPoRATE TRUST ADmNISTRATON 1 (1961)).
25. Garrett, A Borrower's View of the Model Corporate Debenture Indenture Provisions,
21 Bus. LAW. 675, 675 (1966).
26. Smith & Warner, supra note 7, at 123.
27. FoRTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 266.
28. McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?, 38 Bus. LAW.
867 (1983).
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through bilateral safeguards. 29 Bondholders do not fit this description.
Thus, the board of directors could be seen as a governance instrument
of the stockholders) °
The potential costs of bondholder voting rights outweigh the value
of board representation. First, if bondholder directors become control
persons under the federal securities laws, they are potentially liable for
false and misleading statements of the company. Second, trade credi-
tors and stockholders might seek to recoup their losses by charging
bondholder directors with mismanagement or breaches of fiduciary
duty. Finally, a bondholder with control may have claims subordi-
nated to other creditors upon bankruptcy"
A superior alternative to voting rights is to have a corporation in-
sure its bonds . With insured bonds, bondholders receive better pro-
tection from risk alteration since the risk is shifted from the
bondholder to the insurer.33 Insurance companies can negotiate for
protective covenants in the bond indenture and can monitor the firm
in meeting its contractual obligations. For instance, if the indenture is
found to be too restrictive to the firm, the insurance company can
amend it with ease by having negotiations with a single insurer rather
than with thousands of bondholders. 34
Insurance companies also have a higher stake in the corporation.
Unlike bond trustees, who have no stake and no duty until default,
the insurance company has a substantial stake in the company and a
vested interest to monitor the firm.3 5 In sum, insured bonds combine
the advantages of both a public borrowing and a private placement. 36
Portfolio insurance can also be used by bondholders to insure their
bonds. Protection will be obtained, but this insurance is only practical
for those investors with a buy-and-hold strategy rather than those
investors with a trading strategy.3 When bonds are resold, portfolio
insurance does not protect against risk alteration since the insurance
29. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) (control person liability under federal securities law), 11
U.S.C. § 510 (subordination of claims in bankruptcy); see DeNatale & Abram, The Doctrine of
Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAw. 417 (1985).
32. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 89,
101-03 (1985) (discussion of debt insurance purchased by corporation from third party insurers
for benefit of creditors).
33. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 436.
34. Id. at 436-437.
35. Id. at 437.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 439; see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors,
88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1150-51 & n.36 (1979).
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does not run with the bonds.3 8 Therefore, such insurance is not as ef-
fective as when a corporation insures its own debt. 39
C. Market Forces
Market forces may constrain managerial behavior that is adverse to
bondholders. However, market forces are only effective if more bonds
are offered in the future. For example, a company that expects to sell
bonds from time-to-time has an incentive to avoid inflicting losses on
existing bondholders, since a company with a reputation for hurting
its bondholders will find it more difficult to sell bonds in the future. 40
New investors will either not buy the bonds or demand a higher return
as compensation.4' As Brealey and Myers put it, "A company that
makes a killing today at the expense of a creditor will be coldly re-
ceived when the time comes to borrow again." 42 While market forces
may help to dissuade management from mistreating bondholders, ad-
ditional alternatives are needed to protect bondholders.
III. THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO BONDHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER CON-
FLICTS
Many solutions to bondholder-shareholder conflicts have been of-
fered for bondholders when they find themselves isolated and unpro-
tected from shareholder expropriations. Such solutions include: (1)
equal fiduciary duties should be owed to shareholders and bondhold-
ers; (2) the indenture trustee or another third party should have a fi-
duciary duty to represent and to protect bondholder interests during
negotiation of the indenture contract and to subsequently monitor
corporate decisions; and (3) wealth maximization should be pursued
in the interest of all classes of security holders, bondholders and
shareholders alike. Because these alternatives require significant
changes in the current system of corporate governance, they are un-
likely to be implemented.
38. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 438.
39. Portfolio insurance would approximate the insurance by a corporation of its own debt
if all bondholders in the market have portfolio insurance: on resale, the bonds would be covered
by the new bondholder's portfolio insurance. However, this is unlikely to be the case.
40. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 434.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing R. BREAIEr & S. Mma~s, Psin~cEnLs of CoipoATE FINANCE 399 (2nd ed.
1984)).
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A. Equal Fiduciary Duties Needed
Generally, bondholders are protected by the indenture and stock-
holders are protected by directors. 43 Some argue that this tidy concept
cannot be expected to serve modern corporate finance because the in-
denture "does not and cannot protect bondholders."" Recent changes
in the bond market further demonstrate the need for enhanced bond-
holder protection, including enormous market growth, increased trad-
ing, lower-quality issues, and increased participation by less
sophisticated individual investors. 45
A point in favor of enhanced bondholder protection is limited bond
value information. In an efficient market, all available information
about a company is reflected in the prices of its securities. With
bonds, public access to value information is limited by the "nine-bond
rule," New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") rule 396, which allows
trades of over ten bonds to occur in off-floor transactions.4 Since al-
most all trades are over ten bonds, dealers can monopolize informa-
tion on bond prices and can create market inefficiencies. 47 Bond prices
that do not reflect actual values, particularly in such a growing mar-
ket, advance the need for increased bondholder protection.
Another significant point is that distinctions between debt and eq-
uity securities are "increasingly blurred." Many high-yield, low-rated
bonds trade like equity, while many preferred stocks resemble debt.
Hybrid securities, such as convertibles, combine both debt and equity
features. Also, distinctions between bondholders and stockholders are
correspondingly blurred, particularly for the investor with a trading
strategy. Today's stockholder is tomorrow's bondholder, switching
from an equity-weighted portfolio, to a debt-weighted portfolio, and
then to a mixed portfolio as interest rates and stock prices fluctuate.
The blurring of securities and of investors may be a signal for a
reconsideration of fiduciary boundaries. The changes in the bond
market and the inefficiencies created by bond price monopolization
send a similar signal. These signals, coupled with the lack of protec-
tion afforded to bondholders by the indenture," suggest that bond-
43. Id. at 413; see AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, Co N mAmREs ON INDENTURES 2 (1971) (a
bondholder's rights are contractual; they are protected only from extremely harmful acts and in
bankruptcy).
44. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 413.
45. See id. at 414-15.
46. Rule 396(c)(i), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2396 (1982).
47. See Quint, Antitrust Study of U.S. Bond Trading, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1983, at Dl,
col. 3 (Justice Department investigation into antitrust violations by banks and brokerage houses
in trading).
48. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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holders and stockholders are all security holders in the enterprise and
are equally deserving of board protection through fiduciary duties.
B. Indenture Trustee as Protector
The bondholder indenture agreement is designed to protect the
bondholder through restrictive covenants while the corporation is sol-
vent and through its trustee upon the corporation's default. While the
oversight powers of the trustee upon the corporation's default are
substantial and sufficient to protect bondholder interests, the trustee
has few or no oversight powers or duties over the corporation while it
is solvent.
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 ("TIA") 9 established the duties
and responsibilities of the indenture trustee. The Act, however, pro-
vided no role for the trustee during negotiations and for few monitor-
ing responsibilities during the solvency of the corporation. Moreover,
the Act's mandatory provisions offer little to help debtholders con-
trol, prevent, or even dissuade managerial opportunism prior to de-
fault.
An indenture trustee can be charged with the responsibilities of
managerial oversight to ensure the terms of the indenture are met as
well as to take part in the negotiation of those terms.50 Bondholders
need better representation in the negotiation process of the indenture
contract because the contract is more often than not negotiated and
finalized between the issuer and the underwriter, and the debtholders,
as a widely dispersed class, are effectively prevented from participat-
ing in the negotiation. One commentator writes:
In a publicly placed issue the terms, including the protective
provisions, are usually set by the issuer or by his agents [the
underwriter]. Their primary concern is to get the best possible terms
for the issuer, with protection for the investor a decidedly secondary
consideration. The purchaser, if he buys, has to accept the terms set
by the seller."
The issuer is further concerned with obtaining a low interest rate and
few restrictive covenants, and the underwriter wants the best rating
possible to enhance marketability. Since the underwriter must resell
the securities, it is thought that the underwriter will protect its own
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1982).
50. Robertson, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial Dis-
cretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 Huv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y. 461 (1988).
51. E. CoREY, DuRECT PLACEMENT OF CORPORAT SEcurrIms 90 (1951).
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name by protecting the buyer, but "the law can hardly leave investors
subject to the doubtful protection of private consciences.''52 Clearly,
better representation is needed.
As an alternative to imposing a fiduciary duty on corporate offi-
cers, and thereby rejecting contract law, such a duty could be imposed
on a trustee or a third party. Requiring a fiduciary duty to both bond-
holders and stockholders could create substantial difficulties in mak-
ing managerial decisions. For instance, how would management
decide between the two classes when a decision benefitting one class
harms the other (for example, a decision to pay a dividend on com-
mon shares), or how would a court supervise such a decision?" There-
fore, establishing duties for the trustee or a third party to monitor
both indenture negotiations and management decisions could be pref-
erable. As set forth in the indenture, the trustee or third party could
act as a board member with the power to enjoin actions, by suit if
necessary, if management interferes with indenture protections or at-
tempts to endanger bond value. Third party "trustees" could be rep-
resentatives of the underwriter, an accounting firm, or a law firm.54
As one commentator noted, "[wihile the debenture holder's best in-
surance against loss is to invest in companies that are financially
sound, the debenture holder is nonetheless entitled to a legal system
that protects its interests against managers who favor shareholders'
interests."5
C. Wealth Maximization for All Security Holders
As an additional alternative to imposing fiduciary duties on corpo-
rate officers to protect bondholder interests, a general duty to maxi-
mize "global" wealth could be imposed on management. 56 Aristotle
said that "the house is there that men may live in it, but it is also there
because the builders have laid one stone upon another.15 7 The corpo-
ration is built or financed by both equity and debt. It may well be an
anomaly in the system of corporate governance that equity takes prec-
edence over debt in wealth maximization.
52. Palmer, Trusteeship Under the Trust Indenture, 41 CoLuM. L. REv. 193, 213 (1941)
(quoting BELa, STrmms [N TE LAW OF CORPORATION FiNANCE 44-45 (1928)).
53. See Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1264
(1982).
54. The alternatives of third-party accounting firms or law firms as trustees are especially
noteworthy because of the expertise of such firms and because of their own professional rules
that would reduce chances of conflicts of interest.
55. Robertson, supra note 50, at 486.
56. Barkley, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary
Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREiGrroN L. REv. 47, 74 (1986).
57. D. THOMPSON, On Growth and Form 5 (1961) (providing a statement of the parable).
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A central dogma of corporate practice views the corporation as
seeking to maximize the value of its stock without direct regard for
the value of other classes of securities.5" This dogma operates with
three assumptions: (1) a managerial fiduciary duty to stockholders
does not also imply corresponding duties to the corporation's other
classes of security holders; (2) equitable ownership of the corpora-
tion's assets by stockholders does not also imply corresponding own-
erships by other classes of security holders; and (3) maximizing the
value of the corporation's stock is equivalent to maximizing the value
of the corporation's assets.59
The anomaly in the rule of equity-preference in market value maxi-
mization and the resulting stockholder expropriations creates conflicts
between stockholders and bondholders .6 Stockholder-appointed di-
rectors determine production and investment policy that maximize
shareholder wealth. However, the inequity would not be resolved if
the indenture contract required bondholders rather than stockholders
to decide investment policy, since bondholders would choose invest-
ments that maximized bond value rather than share value.6' Further-
more, additional costs would be imposed if bondholders assume
control of the corporation. 62
One solution to the inequity between bondholders and stockholders
is to require the corporation through its officers and directors to: (1)
make decisions that maximize the wealth of all security holders, not
specifically shareholders; and (2) make corporate side payments so
that all classes of security holders would receive the same amount of
wealth as those classes would otherwise attain through the current sys-
tem. This new fiduciary "articulation" could theoretically benefit all
security holders by implicitly forbidding corporate decisions that
would substantially increase the risk of corporate bankruptcy without
correspondingly maximizing the present value of the corporation's as-
sets. This articulation would inherently subsume protective contrac-
tual provisions for bondholders and fiduciary duties to shareholders.
D. Summary of the Three Alternatives
The three alternatives propose replacing the current system with one
that would insure protection to all security holders. The recurring
58. See Norris, Not the Preferred Treatment: Proposed Uniroyal Buyout Hurts One Class
of Securities, BARuoN's, June 17, 1985, at 45, col. 1.
59. Barkley, supra note 56, at 48.
60. Id.
61. Smith & Warner, supra note 7, at 130; see also, Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17.
62. Id.
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theme of these and other alternatives is that in a world of agency costs
and shareholder expropriations, bondholders are insufficiently pro-
tected.
In the current system, corporate governance allows for investing in
instruments with various degrees of risk. Bondholders enjoy far lower
level of risk than shareholders because, in the event of liquidation due
to insolvency or otherwise, they enjoy priority over shareholders for
the corporation's assets until their claims are satisfied. Bondholders
look to the indenture to protect themselves from increases in the debt-
to-equity ratio prior to liquidation. The shareholders trust the direc-
tors, acting in accordance with their fiduciary duties, to make every
effort to maximize shareholder wealth.
Equating debt to equity for purposes of director fiduciary duties
could eliminate or homogenize the differences in risks that various fi-
nancial instruments create, particularly if it led to the equation of debt
with equity for purposes of priority for corporate assets. The capital
market system necessitates a certain amount of freedom from external
regulation. Too much external control over corporations, either by
government or by security holders, could interfere with legitimate cor-
porate decisions to make risky investment decisions. Also, corpora-
tions and security holders could be denied profits associated with
facing and circumventing risks in investment decisions. Therefore, any
attempts to change the control of corporate governance could deny
investors the freedom of choosing the amount of risk they wish to
bear and could also deny corporations the freedom to choose among
investment policies with varying degrees of risk. 63
The notion of creating a risk-free debt market brings to mind the
story of Mark Twain meeting with Members of the Fabian Society in
England. When they explained to him their picture of a world without
harm or danger, Twain replied that it sounded like a meadow full of
cows after the last wolf had been shot. A corporate world in which
directors owe fiduciary duties to bondholders might be well-intended
but might also interfere with legitimate risk-taking by shareholders.
And after all, the problems faced by unsecured bondholders are iden-
tical to the problems faced by ordinary unsecured creditors, and like
ordinary creditors, bondholders have the alternative of purchasing se-
cured debt.
63. Another problem in eliminating differences between equity and debt would be in losing
favorable tax treatment for debt interest under the IRS code to both the corporation and debt-
holders. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 302 (1988).
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IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE
FIDUCIARY-DUTY-TO-BONDHOLDERS ISSUE
Despite some challenges to the traditional model of corporate gov-
ernance, most courts hold that fiduciary duties do not extend to debt-
holders. By applying contract principles, the courts refuse to go
beyond the express terms of the indenture contract to provide addi-
tional protection for bondholders. The courts find that the indenture
contract adequately delineates bondholder rights. In some cases,
courts do imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing to protect
the bondholders' express, bargained-for rights when a violation of a
contractual term has been found. Yet, the courts do not reach far be-
yond the terms of the contract to imply this covenant. The message
being sent is that debtholders are the corporation's creditors and as
such are directed to engage in self-protection.
A. The Delaware Courts
In Delaware, the courts have consistently recognized that neither an
issuer of debentures nor a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary
duty of loyalty and fairness to holders of the company's debt securi-
ties." The Delaware courts have found "that a debenture holder has
no independent right to maintain a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
and in absence of fraud, insolvency or statutory violations, a deben-
ture holder's rights are defined by the terms of the indenture.'"65
Delaware courts also do not assign any significance to the fact that
the debentures in question are convertible into stock at the option of
the holder. In Simons v. Cogan,66 the court cited a quote by Justice
Holmes from 1889 stating that the convertibility feature was "simply
an option to take stock as it may turn out to be when the time for
choice arrives. The bondholder does not become a stockholder by his
contract, in equity any more than at law. ' 67 The court in Simons con-
cluded:
While the convertibility feature of convertible [debt instruments]
creates an economic interest in an issuers stock price, so long as the
64. Mann v. Oppenheimer Co., 517 A.2d 1056 (Del. 1986); Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785
(Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., No. C.A. 7888 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 1987) (Westlaw No. 1987 WL
55826); Norte & Co. v. Manor Health Care Corp., No. C.A. 6827 (Del. Ch. November 21, 1985)
(Westlaw No. 1985 WL 44684); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
65. Continental Illinois, No. C.A. 7888, slip op. at 5.
66. 542 A.2d 785.
67. Id. at 788-789.
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right to convert is not exercised, it remains merely an option, and the
holder of it retains all of the benefits of his creditor status. Until the
moment of exercise, his investment is not held subject to the risks
that the fiduciary duty concept was designed to address, but is held
pursuant to a negotiated contract detailing rights and duties and
conferring upon the creditor a legal right to repayment."
The Delaware courts have clearly held that holders of convertible
debt are not considered shareholders either. 69 In Norte & Co. v Manor
Healthcare Corp. o70 the Delaware Chancery stated:
Inasmuch as ownership of a convertible debenture does not give the
holder the rights of a shareholder, the holder of a convertible
debenture would have almost no protection against acts by the
Company which would adversely affect the value of the common
stock issuable on conversion, such as a split-up of shares, stock
dividends, distribution of assets .... merger, sale of assets or
dissolution and liquidation of the Company. Events of this type are
customarily described as "diluting" the value of the conversion
privilege, and if protection is desired against such dilution,
appropriate provisions must be included in the indenture."'
The Delaware Chancery also concluded in Harff v. Kerkorian 2 that
the holders of a corporation's convertible debt were not stockholders
in equity, entitled to have standing to maintain a derivative suit. The
court added that the holders of convertible debt instruments were not
beneficiaries of any fiduciary duties. Therefore, the holders of con-
vertible debentures were treated only as corporate creditors to whom
contractual duties but no fiduciary duties were owed, unless they as-
sumed the risks of stockholder status through the exercise of the
power of conversion.
B. Decisions Rejecting the Extension of Fiduciary Duties
In Simons v. Cogan,7 a class action was brought on behalf of the
holders of 8-1/87o Convertible Subordinated Debentures of Knoll In-
68. Id. at 791.
69. Id.; Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., No.
C.A. 7888 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 1987) (Westlaw No. 1987 WL 55826); Norte & Co. v. Manor
Health Care Corp., No. C.A. 6827 (Del. Ch. November 21, 1985) (Westlaw No. 1985 WL
44684).
70. No. C.A. 6827.
71. Id. at 4 (quoting AImmcAN BAR FoUNDATION, supra note 43, at 527).
72. 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974).
73. 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
1991]
986 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 18:971
ternational, Inc. ("Knoll"). The defendants named were Knoll and
Marshall S. Cogan, who controlled Knoll. The complaint alleged that
the issuer owed a fiduciary duty of entire fairness to the holders of its
convertible debentures and that the defendants breached this duty in
structuring the proposed merger. The two-step transaction involved a
$12 cash tender-offer followed by a cash-for-stock merger at the same
price. In the second step of the merger, a Supplemental Indenture was
executed by the issuer, which provided that each convertible debenture
previously convertible into one share of Knoll Class A Common Stock
would henceforth be convertible into the consideration received by the
public Class A shareholders in the merger, $12 cash. While the princi-
pal amount of each debenture was $19.20, the tender was for $12 a
share of common stock, which resulted in a substantial loss to the
debtholders. Regardless of this loss, the court found that neither the
issuer nor the directors owed a fiduciary duty to the convertible debt-
holders.
The court opined that the law in Delaware was firmly fixed in that
bondholders are owed no duty of the broad and exacting nature char-
acterized as a fiduciary duty.74 Unlike shareholders, to whom such a
duty is owed, debtholders must turn to documents that exhaustively
detail the rights and obligations of the issuer and of the holders of
securities. 75 These documents are carefully negotiated at arms-length
wherein the purchaser of such debt is offered, and voluntarily accepts,
a security whose myriad of terms are highly specified. Therefore, the
broad abstract requirements of a fiduciary character have little use in
the governance of such a negotiated, commercial relationship. Ac-
cordingly, the debtholder's rights are fixed and determined from the
language of the documents that create and regulate the security. 76
As in Delaware, the California courts have refused to impose fidu-
ciary responsibilities upon corporations with respect to bondholders.
In Kessler v. General Cable Corp. ,77 the holders of convertible deben-
tures issued by a Massachusetts corporation filed an action against a
New Jersey corporation, which had substantially acquired all of the
Massachusetts corporation's stock. The court held that the Massachu-
setts corporation did not breach any fiduciary duty to the holders of
its convertible debentures by selling its stock to the New Jersey corpo-
ration, even though the sale resulted in the delisting of those deben-
tures from the New York Stock Exchange. The court reasoned that
74. Id. at 786.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 786-787.
77. 155 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1979).
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imposing a fiduciary duty would constitute an expansion of the pres-
ent law in contradiction of current case law.78
C. Challenges to the Delaware Rulings
Some jurisdictions have challenged the traditional Delaware view. A
body of judicial opinion exists that demonstrates a willingness to ex-
tend the protection offered by the fiduciary concept to the relation-
ship between an issuer and the holder of convertible debt securities. 79
However, none of the appellate opinions represent a holding that ac-
tually extends the fiduciary concept, and in fact, prevailing judicial
opinion remains to the contrary.80
A few circuits have considered whether a fiduciary duty may exist
under certain circumstances.
In Broad v. Rockwell International Corp.,8' the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that an issuer of convertible debentures does owe a
duty of good faith and fair dealing to its debenture holders. 82 The
court noted that if the issuer had fully complied with the terms of the
debenture agreement then the issuer had discharged its contractual ob-
ligation and the fiduciary duty claim should not be reached. 83 On re-
hearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the
panel's conclusion was correct that the issuer was charged with a fidu-
ciary duty to the debenture holders. The court found that the earlier
court should not have considered, the existence of any fiduciary duties
since the issuer had fully complied with its obligations under the in-
denture.Y
In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,85 the Boeing corporation failed to
provide its debenture holders with adequate notice of a redemption.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying New York law, found
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the debenture
contract and found that convertible debentures have a special nature
due to the expectation of the holder that the stock will rise sufficiently
in value to make the debenture worth more than the debt.8 The court
78. Id. at 103.
79. Simons, 542 A.2d at 790.
80. Id.
81. 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981).
82. Id. at 430.
83. Id. at 431.
84. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981).
85. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
86. Id. at 1385.
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noted that "an award against Boeing will in effect tend to reduce pro
tanto the equity of shareholders in the corporation and thus to a large
extent those who were benefitted, one might almost say unjustly, will
be the one who pay [debentureholder's] loss.87
Only one judge indicated a willingness to go further and find an
"underlying duty of fair treatment[ ]owed by the corporation or ma-
jority stockholders or controlling directors and officers" to bondhold-
ers.s However, in a later phase of the case, another panel of the
Second Circuit emphasized that the rationale for the result reached in
Van Gemert was based on a breach of contract and not on a breach of
a fiduciary duty.89
In Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,90 the hold-
ers of convertible debentures brought an action against the corpora-
tion, alleging that the corporation's failure to notify the debenture
holders of a dividend payment to shareholders violated federal securi-
ties laws. Circuit Judge Gibbons noted in his opinion that although no
Maryland case had been presented addressing the issue of fiduciary
obligations to holders of securities containing stock options, he
"would be very much surprised if Maryland or any other state would
today hold that no [fiduciary] obligations were owed by an issuer of
[convertible] securities and its directors." 9' The other two members of
the panel, however, specifically disavowed such a conclusion. 92
Ultimately, the court's decision was based on the contractual doc-
trine of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In Green v. Hamilton International Corp. 93 the owners of converti-
ble debentures alleged common law fraud and violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act for the corporation's concealment of purported
merger negotiations, which prevented the owners from acquiring in-
formation that would have encouraged a conversion rather than re-
demption. In a footnote, the court asserted another ground for relief,
the breach of a fiduciary duty by the corporation. Quoting from the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Pepper v. Litton,94 the
court added:
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1382 (dicta by Oakes, J., author of majority opinion, emphasizing that the other
members of the panel did not base their decision on this ground).
89. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977).
90. 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
91. Id. at 941.
92. Id. at 943-46 (Garth, J., concurring); id. at 946-54 (Adams, J., dissenting).
93. 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y 1977).
94. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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As holders of convertible debentures, plaintiffs were part of "the
entire community of interests in the corporation-creditors as well as
stockholders" to whom the fiduciary duties of directors and
controlling shareholders run. 95
The district court construed the Delaware Supreme Court's reversal in
Harff v. Kerkorian" as permitting a conclusion that a fiduciary duty
to convertible debenture holders may exist. In a slip opinion, the dis-
trict court made a statement that does not appear in the reported deci-
sion:
If wrongs alleged impinged upon the equity aspects [of convertible
debt], then the analysis would more properly treat plaintiffs like
shareholders to whom the majority shareholders and directors of the
corporation owe a duty of honest, loyalty, good faith and fairness.
9 7
According to the court in Simons, the analysis in Green was flawed
in two respects. First, the court in Green misread the court's conclu-
sion in Harff, and second, the court's analysis regarding fiduciary du-
ties was unpersuasive. The court in Simons stated:
[That] a convertibility feature of a debt security creates an economic
interest in the issuer's stock price that the holder of a straight debt
instrument would not have is plain. But, it does not follow at all that
from such additional economic interest, fiduciary duties of loyalty,
etc. necessarily or properly flow. Such duties.., have been imposed
upon those to whom property has been entrusted to manage for the
benefit of another .... But, it has not been extended to negotiated
commercial transactions where the original property owner transfers
it with a contractual right to repayment. Thus, for example, no case
holds that the relationship between a bank and its borrower involves
a fiduciary duty running from the borrower .... 9s
After its decision in Green, the Southern District of New York agreed
with the Delaware Supreme Court's affirmance in Simons that "a
bondholder acquires no equitable interest and remains a creditor of
the corporation whose interests are protected by the contractual terms
of the indenture."9 Thus, it is unlikely that a court today would find
95. Green, 437 F. Supp. at 729 n.4.
96. 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
97. Green v. Hamilton, No. 76-5433, slip op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1981).
98. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
99. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (citing Simons, 549 A.2d at 304).
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that corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the hold-
ers of convertible debentures.
D. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
A somewhat different question is whether there is an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing under contract law that can pro-
tect bondholders. The relationship between the corporation and the
holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt securities, is gener-
ally held to be contractual in nature. 100 Therefore, a plaintiff may al-
ways allege a violation of an express covenant.' 0' If there has been a
violation, the court need not reach the question of whether or not an
implied covenant has been violated:
That inquiry surfaces where, while express terms may not have been
technically breached, one party has nonetheless effectively deprived
the other of those express, explicitly bargained-for benefits. In such a
case, a court will read an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into a contract to ensure that neither party deprives the other
of the fruits of the agreement .... Such a covenant is implied only
where the implied term is consistent with other mutually agreed upon
terms in the contract .... In other words, the implied covenant will
only aid and further the explicit terms of the agreement and will
never impose an obligations which would be inconsistent with other
terms of the contractual relationship. 0 2
Implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing are recognized by
New York and Delaware law.103 In contracts for indentures, "[a]n im-
plied covenant ... derives its substance directly from the language of
the Indenture, and cannot give the holders of Debentures any rights
inconsistent with those set out in the Indenture. . . . [Where] plain-
tiffs' contractual rights [have not been] violated, there can have been
no breach of an implied covenant."104
In Van Gemert and Pittsburgh Terminal, the courts used the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to ensure that the debt-
100. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 642 F.2d 929
(5th Cir. Apr. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see also AmERIc.N BAR FouDAtoN,
supra note 43.
101. Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1516.
102. Id. at 1517; see also Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Valero Corp., No. C.A. 9032 (Del.
Ch. June 21, 1988) (Westlaw No. 1988 WL 63491).
103. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975);
Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
vacated on procedural grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873
(Del. Ch. 1986).
104. Gardner, 589 F. Supp. at 673 (quoting Broad, 642 F.2d at 957).
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holders received the benefit of their bargain as determined from the
face of the contract at issue. In Van Gemert, the holders of converti-
ble subordinated debentures alleged inadequate notice of defendant's
intention to redeem their debentures. The contract itself provided that
notice would be given prior to redemption. While the defendants is-
sued a press release that mentioned the possible redemption of the de-
bentures, the release did not specify any dates for redemption or dates
for expiration of the debenture holders' conversion rights.
The court stated:
What one buys when purchasing a convertible debenture in addition
to the debt obligation of the company ... is principally the
expectation that the stock will increase sufficiently in value that the
conversion right will make the debenture worth more than the
debt.... Any loss occurring to him from failure to convert, as here,
is not from a risk inherent in his investment but rather from
unsatisfactory notification procedures. 101
In brief, the court found that an implied covenant protected the de-
benture holders' reasonable expectation of notice. The court in Pitts-
burgh Terminal held that an implied covenant governed the conditions
of the indentures at issue because defendants there "took steps to pre-
vent the bondholders from receiving information, which they needed
in order to receive the fruits of their conversion option should they
choose to exercise it."'10 In both cases, an implied covenant was ap-
plied to protect the bondholder's express rights under the indenture
contract.
In the most recent case decided on this issue, Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,07 the United States District Court
reasoned that the appropriate analysis was first to examine the inden-
ture to determine the "fruits of the agreement" between the parties,
and then to decide whether these "fruits" had been spoiled-that is,
whether plaintiffs' contractual rights had been violated by defen-
dants.108 The court held that the "fruits" of Metropolitan's indentures
did not include an implied restrictive covenant that would prevent the
incurrence of new debt to facilitate the leveraged buyout of RJR Na-
bisco. The court stated:
105. Van Gemert, 520 F.2d at 1385.
106. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
107. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
108. Id. at 1518.
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to hold otherwise would permit these plaintiffs to straight-jacket the
company in order to guarantee their investment. These plaintiffs do
not invoke an implied covenant of good faith to protect a legitimate,
mutually contemplated benefit of the indentures; rather, they seek to
have this Court create an additional benefit for which they did not
bargain. 101
In addition, the court noted that "where parties are sophisticated
investors, well versed in the market's assumptions, and do not stand
in a fiduciary relationship with one another," '" 0 courts are reluctant to
imply terms that have been and remain subject to specific, explicit
provisions in the contract. This decision suggests that courts will not
reach far beyond the contract to imply a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The court must initially find a violation of a contractual
term prior to considering the existence of any implied covenant. This
interpretation is a very narrow application of the rule.
In sum, courts are unlikely to find that the holders of convertible
debentures are owed a fiduciary duty. A court may be willing to use
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if a contractual
right has been violated. However, the courts will narrowly apply the
concept of implied covenants, as is evidenced by the decision in Met-
ropolitan Life. Simply put, the courts do not find it necessary to es-
tablish any protections to debtholders beyond that which currently
exists, and they are unlikely to do so in the future.
V. CoNcLusIoN
Financial theory points to conflicts of interest between shareholders
and bondholders and problems bondholders encounter in seeking to
protect their interests; thus, some commentators suggest that the an-
swer lies in enhancing bondholders' rights. However, the courts have
not accepted these arguments. According to the courts, the bond in-
denture contract is sufficient to defend and to delineate bondholders'
rights. The courts have repeatedly ruled that no sufficient reason ex-
ists to extend fiduciary duties to bondholders, despite protests of in-
denture simplicity and shareholder duplicity.
The courts have increased protection to bondholders by finding im-
plied covenants in the indenture contracts. Yet this remedy is available
only when an explicit right found in the indenture has been violated.
This is purely a contractual right and is not, in any way, a fiduciary
duty.
109. Id. at 1519.
110. Id. at 1522.
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The capital market dictates a world of demand for financial instru-
ments with varying degrees of risk and return. Changing the manner
of corporate governance could lead to the elimination of differences
between financial instruments. This could in turn reduce the range of
risk and return available to both security holders and corporations.
Further, extending corporate fiduciary duty to bondholders would be
difficult to reconcile with the law's treatment of other unsecured cred-
itors. Thus, the approach of the courts has probably been wise.
Bondholders must continue to seek protection in the traditional
methods: through indenture covenants and bond insurance. If these
methods prove ineffective, bondholders should explore the possibility
of purchasing secured debt.

